Where The Light Gets In: Analyzing Web Censorship Mechanisms in India by Yadav, Tarun Kumar et al.
Where The Light Gets In: Analyzing Web Censorship
Mechanisms in India
Tarun Kumar Yadav, Akshat Sinha, Devashish Gosain, Piyush Sharma, Sambuddho Chakravarty
{tarun14110,akshat14132,devashishg,piyushs,sambuddho}@iiitd.ac.in
Indraprastha Insitute of Information Technology Delhi, New Delhi, India
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a detailed study of the Internet censor-
ship in India. We consolidated a list of potentially blocked
websites from various public sources to assess censorship
mechanisms used by nine major ISPs. To begin with, we
demonstrate that existing censorship detection tools like
OONI are grossly inaccurate. We thus developed various
techniques and heuristics to correctly assess censorship and
study the underlying mechanism involved in these ISPs. At
every step we corroborated our finding manually to test the
efficacy of our approach, an exercise largely ignored by sev-
eral others. We fortify our findings by adjudging the cover-
age and consistency of censorship infrastructure, broadly in
terms of average number of network paths and requested do-
mains the infrastructure surveils. Our results indicate a clear
disparity among the ISPs, on how they install censorship in-
frastructure. For instance, in Idea network we observed the
censorious middleboxes on over 90% of our tested intra-AS
paths whereas for Vodafone, it is as low as 2.5%.
We conclude our research by devising our own novel anti-
censorship strategies, that does not depend on third party
tools (like proxies, Tor and VPNs etc.). We managed to
anti-censor all blocked websites in all ISPs under test.
1. INTRODUCTION
Free and open communication over the Internet, and
its censorship, is a widely debated topic. It is not sur-
prising that an overwhelming majority of prior studies
on censorship activities and their mechanism, primarily
center around overtly censorious nations like China [27,
40, 34, 52] and Iran [24]. Most of these studies involve
reporting censorship activities, with some categorically
focusing on the in-depth description of the actual cen-
sorship techniques and mechanism that are employed
by such nations; viz., describing the network location of
the censorship infrastructure, what triggers them and
how are clients notified of such filtering (i.e. if at all).
Through our studies over the past few years, we dis-
covered that even democratic nations like India, have
slowly, and rather covertly, evolved as an infrastruc-
ture for large-scale Internet censorship, involving sev-
eral privately and federally operated ISPs. India’s Inter-
net censorship policies have remained arbitrary (at best
ambivalent)1. Over time several networks have upped
their barriers against users accessing sites, which the ad-
ministration “believes” to be “unfit for consumption”,
resulting in enough citizens facing web censorship.
Rather than analyzing the present censorship infras-
tructure and policies, previous work [22] emphasized on
hypothetical scenarios of potential (future) large scale
censorship (or surveillance) by the state. A mere pre-
liminary report was also presented highlighting the in-
consistent web censorship policies amongst ASes.
We thus formally approached the authorities, filing
a Right to Information [15] request (RTI), inquiring
about the policies and mechanism the government uses
to block content. In response, the authorities shared
that while the censorship policies are confidential, the
onus of implementing them lied with the individual ASes
who could employ any mechanism they chose.
Unambiguous answer from authorities motivates us
to conduct our own detailed analysis of the different
censorship mechanisms the major network operators of
the country employ. We began our research by com-
piling a corpus of about 1200 potentially blocked sites
(PBWs), curated from various Internet sites (e.g. Her-
dict [6], Citizen Labs [10]). Thereafter we obtained net-
work connections for nine popular ISPs.
For assessing censorship, we ran the popular censor-
ship assessment tools like OONI [18] on clients hosted
in these networks. OONI runs two sets of tests, one
at the client and other at their remote control site (as-
sumed to be unfiltered). A mismatch between the re-
sults signals potential censorship. However, our initial
tests yielded considerably high false positives and nega-
tives when tested through different ISPs. For instance,
in Airtel, we obtained a false positive rate of ≈ 80% and
a false negative rate of ≈ 11.6%.
We thus decided to devise our own analysis tech-
niques. We began by observing the ensuing network
connection traffic between our client and the censored
1For e.g. in August 2015, the government issued orders
to block 857 websites, but later backtracked under public
outcry [13]
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site. In one particular ISP network, we observed that
whenever the client connected to the censored site, it
received a valid HTTP response bearing a statutory
censorship notification with appropriate sequence num-
ber and bits (e.g. FIN, RST) in the TCP headers that
enforce the client to disconnect with the server. Even-
tually, the actual response from the censored site also
arrives, but by then the connection is already termi-
nated, and the packet is discarded.
All such protocol exchanges hinted toward the pres-
ence of malicious network elements (we collectively call
middleboxes) that snoop (or intercept) users’ traffic and
upon observing requests to filtered websites, injects the
aforementioned crafted packets to censor traffic.
To identify the network location of such censorship
infrastructures, we devise a technique which we collec-
tively call Iterative Network Tracing, that works on the
principle used by traceroute. It is quite similar to
those proposed earlier by Xu et al. [52] and involves
sending web requests to censored sites but with increas-
ing IP header TTL values, so that en route the messages
encounter middleboxes, that are triggered upon the ar-
rival of request to the censored sites.
Using our approach, Iterative Network Tracing, and
and various heuristics which we developed after observ-
ing peculiarities of censorship techniques, we conducted
an investigative study of various censorship mechanism,
employed by major ISPs in the country. Our research
engages long-term data collections to answer the follow-
ing questions:
• What sequence of protocol messages triggers cen-
sorship?
• Exactly what techniques are employed by ISP net-
works to filter users’ requests to censored sites?
• Approximately what fraction of network paths are
impacted by these censors?
• Is censorship uniform and consistent across the
various ISPs? More specifically –
– Do various ISPs block the same set of sites?
– Do various censorship devices of an ISP (aka
the middleboxes) block the same set of sites?
• How hard or easy is it to bypass such censorship
mechanism?
Unlike several previous efforts, that directly draw con-
clusions based on the results generated by their respec-
tive tools and techniques [30, 31, 44] ours, at every pos-
sible step, involves corroborating the results via manu-
ally connecting to the sites and inspecting the results.
The key contribution of our research efforts, span-
ning over 18 months, involves detailed answers to all
the aforementioned questions. Our findings show that
four of these ISPs viz. Airtel, Vodafone, Idea and Re-
liance Jio (potentially carrying a large fraction of net-
work traffic [22]), employ stateful inspection of HTTP
requests alone to censors access. For some ISPs, like
Idea Cellular, we detected the presence of censorship
infrastructure in over a very large fraction (>90%) of
the intra-AS network paths.
Others, viz. BSNL and MTNL, prime government op-
erators, poison DNS responses for censored sites. In our
experiments, we identified about 600 censorious DNS
resolvers spread across these two ISPs.
Traffic of non-censorious ISPs transiting the censori-
ous ones often gets inadvertently filtered. Collectively,
this is known as collateral damage [39]. We observed
such phenomenon for various non-censorious ISPs in
India. For example, censorship in Vodafone network
causes collateral damage to NKN, an otherwise non-
censorious educational network.
Through our detailed explorations, we discovered net-
work middleboxes that either intercept traffic (like trans-
proxies) or merely snoop on users traffic and sends back
specially crafted messages disconnecting the client–server
connection. While a vast majority of previous efforts,
like [35, 42, 49] report the latter, to the best of our
knowledge we are the first ones to discover the presence
of intercepting middle box in any ISP.
Finally, while relatively powerful censorious nations
have evolved mechanism to counter censorship circum-
vention mechanism [17], we demonstrate simple, yet ef-
fective, mechanisms that can be used to bypass censor-
ship without relying on popular anti-censorship tools
like proxies or VPNs; making them harder to bypass
approaches proposed by others. Our approach relies on
identifying the packets generated from the middleboxes
and filtering them at the client, or sending crafted re-
quests that go undetected by the middleboxes, but are
correctly recognized by the server. This is harder for
ISPs to identify that work by restricting access to anti-
censorship infrastructure. Moreover, efforts to retrofit
the solution into existing censorship middleboxes may
incur high costs on the part of the middlebox manu-
facturers and the ISPs, without factoring in downtimes
and potential failures.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
According to Open Net Initiative report, India is among
the list of countries that restricts the Internet content
and ranks India as “Partly Free” [9]. Internet cen-
sorship in India can be traced back to the year 1999,
where website of the popular Pakistani daily newspaper
‘Dawn’ was blocked from access within India, immedi-
ately after the Kargil War [14]. Since then, there are
numerous instances of Internet censorship recorded [9]
by the orders of the government to an extent of Inter-
net Shutdowns. In the year 2015, there were at least
2
22 instances of Internet shutdowns in different parts of
the country [50]. And later in the same year, Internet
service providers (ISPs) have been asked by the Gov-
ernment of India to block 857 websites, on the basis of
restricting access to pornographic content [3].
Very recently transparency reports published by Face-
book [4] and Google [5] also confirm that censorship in
India is on the rise. It indicates there were a total of
21 instances of complete Internet shutdowns and 1, 228
instances of content removal by Facebook because a ma-
jority of content restricted was alleged to violate local
laws relating to defamation of religion and hate speech.
Thus, we conducted a detailed study of web censor-
ship trends pertaining to Indian ISPs. Specifically, we
aim to explore the censorship mechanism and its asso-
ciated infrastructure deployed in the country.
We begin by discussing important studies in the area
of Internet Censorship, primarily reporting the type and
mechanism of censorship. Zittrain [55] in his seminal
analysis of censorship observed IP, keyword and DNS
filtering in China. Later many studies focused on cen-
sorship specific to particular countries for eg., China [51,
27], Pakistan [42], Italy [20], Greece [48] Iran [24], Egypt
and Libia [28] etc. Verkamp et al., [47] extended this
work by deploying clients in 11 countries to identify
their network censorship activities encompassing IP and
URL filtering, keyword filtering and DNS based censor-
ship etc. Gill et al., [33] rather than deploying clients,
used data gathered by the OpenNet Initiative to detect
censorship in 77 countries.
Dalek et al., [29] used data from Shodan [16] to iden-
tify URL filtering products deployed across many coun-
tries including Qatar, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and India.
For large scale detection of censorship across multiple
countries, there are several projects which provide tools
to determine censorship policy: HerdictWeb [54], Cens-
Mon [45], and Encore [25], OONI [19] and Augur [43].
However, a significant portion of censorship literature
focuses only on the Republic of China — Great Firewall
of China (GFW) [55, 27, 53, 52, 41, 30, 31, 49, 38]. Win-
ter et al., [17] studied how DPI-enabled routers detect
Tor bridges based on specific TLS cipher suits. Others
such as [39] reported that China is heavily contributing
towards collateral damage by DNS filtering. Khattak
et al., [37] observed that GFW operates similarly to
NIDS and found exploitable flaws in state management
of GFW. Later authors in [49], reported that GFW has
evolved over a period of time and previous solutions [37]
to bypass it, have failed. They proposed a novel tool
INTANG, to anti-censor GFW using carefully crafted
packets, without relying on third-party software bun-
dles like Tor and VPNs.
In the year 2017, we [22] explored that Indian ISPs
have incoherent censorship policies and they implement
their own content filters resulting in dramatic differ-
ences in the censorship experienced by customers. Also,
we studied the hypothetical scenario — assuming in fu-
ture, the government of India plans to implement strict
censorship what would be the probable ‘key points’ to
place the filters, for different censorship mechanisms
viz., IP filtering, Prefix Hijack, DNS filtering etc.
In this research, we rather carried out a comprehen-
sive study on the ‘present ’ Internet censorship imple-
mentation in India, which was missing in our previous
analysis.
3. DATA COLLECTION AND APPROACH
For our research, we curated a list of potentially blocked
websites (which we conveniently refer to as PBW) from
different sources which include Citizen Labs [10], Her-
dict [6] and various past government and court orders
of the country [11]. The list includes a total of 1200
websites which we consider to be sensitive (and thus
potentially censored). They span across 7 major cate-
gories viz., escort services, pornography, music, torrent
sites, politics, tools and social networks.
We commenced our research by using the already
available tool OONI [18]. A client which intends to de-
tect possible instances of censorship (at different layers
of network stack) installs OONI probe. This fully au-
tomatic tool, after running for finite time, reports the
blocked websites and possible censorship mechanisms
behind them. After running OONI from five differ-
ent vantage points we observed that it results in high
false positives and negatives. Thus, we created our own
scripts to detect Internet censorship in India.
3.1 The OONI tool
Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)
[19], is an open source tool under the Tor project and
is designed to detect censorship.
We ran OONI on five popular ISP networks, using
the PBW, and recorded the results. To corroborate our
findings we also manually checked the sites that were re-
ported by OONI as being censored. To our surprise, we
observed very few true positives. An exceedingly large
number of sites which were reported as being censored
was however easily accessible.
Table 1 summarizes our findings. The rows represent
the ISPs, columns correspond to the type of censorship
reported by OONI, and each entry is a 2-tuple (P,R)
representing the precision and recall.
To explain our results better we use the example of
data gathered for Airtel (a major ISP of the country2).
The OONI tool reported that about 78 sites (BO) were
being blocked by the Airtel. Upon manual inspection we
observed this number to be much higher, i.e. 133 (BM ).
Only 15 websites (BO ∩ BM ) that were actually being
censored were also corrected detected by OONI. This
2In terms of network paths it intercepts [22]
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Popular Censorship Type
ISPs Total DNS TCP HTTP
MTNL 0.57, 0.42 0.44, 0.10 0, 0 0.60, 0.64
Airtel 0.19, 0.11 0, 0 0, 0 0.19, 0.11
Idea 0.57, 0.62 0, 0 0, 0 0.57, 0.62
V odafone 0.69, 0.82 0, 0 0, 0 0.70, 0.78
Jio 0.34, 0.15 0, 0 0, 0 0.36, 0.14
Table 1: Accuracy of OONI: Precision and Re-
call values, measured in various ISPs.
provides us with a precision of 0.19 (|BO ∩ BM |/|BO|)
and a recall of 0.11 (|BO ∩BM |/|BM |). Similar results
were observed for other ISPs as well.
Such low values of precision and recall can be at-
tributed to the fact that OONI tool uses rudimentary
approaches to detect potential censoring activities. For
instance, while detecting DNS filtering, it compares the
IP address of a given host name returned by Google
DNS resolver (which they assume to not be tampered)
with the IP address mapped to that website by the
client’s ISP. If the two IP addresses of the same website
are different they assume it to be censorship. But, in
many cases differences in URL resolution is likely an
artifact of network hosting architectures (e.g. CDNs).
Also, while detecting HTTP filtering, OONI sends
an HTTP request to a given website over the network
where the client (running the OONI probe) is hosted.
Following it, the same request is sent from the control
server (of OONI). HTTP responses obtained from these
requests are compared (based on a threshold) and the
website is assumed to be filtered if the responses differ.
However, while doing our experiments, in many cases
we observed that in spite of having the difference in the
results, websites are not blocked (explained in detail in
section 6).
Thus, for our research, we abandoned OONI and cre-
ated our own semi-automatic scripts to record the cen-
sorship instances by various ISPs across India. For in-
stance, similar to OONI, we tried sending GET requests
to PBWs from the client in test ISPs and through Tor.
If the difference in responses is less than the threshold
we considered them non-censored, otherwise we manu-
ally inspect the responses further, unlike OONI, which
directly flags them as censorious. For instance, in Airtel
network, when we selected the threshold as 0.3, we ob-
served that difference between aforementioned HTTP
responses for 390 websites, were more than the thresh-
old. On manually verifying the contents we observed
that 40% of 390 websites were still non-censored3. We
repeated the same experiments for all test ISPs under
consideration and found that 30− 40% of the websites
which would have been flagged as censorious by OONI
are actually non-censorious.
3This difference between the responses is further explained
in section 6.
We now present our approach for determining the
type of censorship (DNS, TCP/IP and HTTP blocking)
and mechanisms behind them.
3.2 DNS Blocking
I. Background:. For ordinary netizens, DNS resolu-
tion is the primary step for accessing any website. URL
entered by such netizens is first resolved to its associated
correct IP address. Thus, invariably censors exploit this
step, and often return an incorrect IP address, resulting
in website’s unavailability.
DNS based blocking can be achieved by (1) DNS poi-
soning [46]— whereby a local resolver is corrupted and
replies with the incorrect IP for the specific DNS queries
(2) DNS injection [23] — where some middlebox be-
tween the client and local resolver intercepts the DNS
query and deliberately responds with an incorrect IP
address.
II. Identifying filtered domains:. In order to iden-
tify DNS filtering by ISPs, we selected PBWs that could
otherwise be successfully resolved through Tor circuits
(ending with exit nodes in non-censorious nations). There-
after, we attempted to resolve these PBWs through
ISPs that we chose to test for potential censorship ac-
tivities.
A URL may resolve to different IP addresses, depend-
ing on the network from which resolution is attempted
(due to reasons such as CDN based hosting). We iden-
tified URLs whose resolution resulted in an overlapping
set of IPs when the resolution was attempted both by
the client (hosted in the ISP under consideration), as
well as via the Tor circuit. The sites corresponding
to such overlapping sets of IPs were considered uncen-
sored.
In order to ascertain DNS filtering on the remain-
ing list, we first tested our intuition i.e., an ISP, may
resolve multiple blocked websites to some unique IP ad-
dresses. Thus, we performed frequency analysis on the
observed IP addresses i.e, if more than one website is
resolved to same IP address4, we checked it for DNS
filtering. Invariably we found static IP address of the
same ISP appearing multiple times. We also observed
several bogon IP [1] addresses.
Thus, for the remaining URLs, that resolved to non-
overlapping sets of IP addresses, we applied the fol-
lowing heuristics to decide if they corresponded to re-
sponses that is seemingly manipulated by the censor.
1. Resolved IPs belong to the same AS that hosts the
client: None of the PBWs were hosted in the clients’
AS. Thus if any of the resolved IPs belong to the
4We initially scanned the list and removed those cases for
which multiple websites were actually hosted on the same
IP address.
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clients’ AS (the one under test), the AS is con-
sidered censorious and the corresponding URL is
marked censored.
2. Resolved IPs are Bogons: If any of the resolved IPs
is a bogon [1], we consider the AS to be censorious
and the URL as being censored.
In order to ensure that only the aforementioned heuris-
tics are applied by our tested ISPs, to the remaining
IPs we sent the HTTP request through Tor circuit. We
manually confirmed that content was received from all
the IP addresses, indicating that all the remaining IPs
were correctly mapped to the websites.
III. Identifying DNS filtering mechanism:. After
identifying the set of websites which are censored due
to DNS filtering, we intended to identify the mechanism
behind the blocking. To that end, we began by iden-
tifying all open DNS resolvers of the ISP under con-
sideration. To do this we send DNS queries requesting
resolution for otherwise uncensored sites (e.g. our own
institution’s website) whose correct IP address is known
beforehand, to the entire IPv4 address space of the said
ISP. DNS resolvers, even if censorious but otherwise
configured correctly, are expected to respond to such
queries with legitimate IP addresses.
In order to identify only the censorious resolvers, we
sent 1200 DNS queries, corresponding to the individual
PBWs, to each of the DNS resolvers (in each of the
individual censorious ISP). Resolvers which responded
with manipulated IP address (even for one DNS query),
are considered to be censorious.
In order to determine how and where censorship
happens, i.e. DNS injection by middleboxes or ma-
nipulated responses by the poisoned resolvers involves
a variant of our Iterative Network Tracer (as shown in
figure 1). We began by identifying the router-level path
between them beforehand using traceroute. There-
after, the client sends DNS requests (corresponding to
PBWs) to only censorious DNS resolver by iteratively
increasing IP TTL values. Identifying censorship mech-
anism would involve checking if the responses (between
the client and a PBW) arrives from any network hop
other than the last one. Responses from network hops
other than the last ones are likely due to middleboxes,
else they are due to poisoned resolvers.
In all our tests we received manipulated IP addresses
from the last hop only, indicating the presence of DNS
poisoning.
3.3 TCP/IP Packet Filtering
Network protocol header based filtering is a rather ill
defined, albeit very commonly assumed, network cen-
sorship technique. It is frequently believed by netizens
that ISPs filter traffic based on IP addresses and port
1 
Sensitive request 
(with increasing TTL) 
Censored response 
Actual response 
TTL=9 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 
Client Destination 
TTL=1 
TTL=2 
TTL=3 
TTL=4 
Figure 1: Iterative Network Tracer: client sends
a crafted query (DNS query/HTTP GET request)
containing a blocked domain with increasing
TTL. Censored response is observed from the
malacious network element.
numbers. Not surprisingly several past research efforts
focus on detecting censorship where they claim that
ISPs filter traffic based on IP addresses. To that end,
they primarily rely on packet drops corresponding to
TCP connection attempts [43] and claim them to be
due to IP level censorship.
In general, IP address based censorship may be as-
sociated with various kinds of systemic failures such as
network congestion and outages, router disconnections
and delays in route re-computations and convergence.
More, it may be hard to distinguish IP address based
censorship from local firewalling by the site operator,
as that may also result in packet drops. Finally, un-
like HTTP censorship, which often involves users receiv-
ing censorship notification packets, IP address filtering
drops reveal no information to the client, and become
hard to distinguish it from the other reasons mentioned.
Such scenarios are very difficult to validate (an impor-
tant, and often ignored aspect of prior research [43]).
Nevertheless, we used a rather crude approach to
detect filter based on network and transport protocol
headers. We attempted a TCP 3− way handshake us-
ing a Tor circuit, terminating in a non-censorious coun-
try, to the PBWs. For those websites where connection
succeeded via Tor, we again attempted five subsequent
TCP 3−way handshakes (from the ISP under test) with
a delay of approximately two seconds between each of
them. If it failed in all attempts, it implies TCP/IP fil-
tering. However, in none of the ISPs, we ever obtained
this form of censorship.
3.4 HTTP Filtering
I. Background:. HTTP filtering aims at hampering
the communication between client and server by ob-
serving the content of HTTP packets. The censor can
achieve this type of filtering by deploying middleboxes
in the network (placed between the client and the blocked
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domain).
II. Detecting HTTP filtering:. In our experiments,
we tested all our ISPs for potential censorship using
our curated list of 1200 PBWs. We began by creat-
ing Tor circuits terminating in non-censorious coun-
tries. Through these, we tried accessing all the PBWs.
The retrieved contents were compared against the con-
tents obtained by connecting directly to same respective
PBWs, directly from our clients hosted in the individual
ISPs.
We calculated the HTTP diff 5 between the afore-
mentioned responses and if the difference is less than
the threshold (0.3 in our case), we consider it to be
non-blocked otherwise else we manually inspected all
the responses to remove false positives/negatives.
III. Which HTTP messages trigger censorship?.
We initiated our study of determining what triggers
censorship by observing the protocol messages between
client and PBWs. For e.g., for a client hosted in Air-
tel, we observed that as soon after it sends an HTTP
GET request to a PBW (following a regular TCP 3-way
handshake), a HTTP 200 OK response packet arrives,
whose source IP address is that of the PBW. It had the
TCP FIN bit set and payload carried the censorship
notification. TCP FIN bit forced the client’s browser
to initiate TCP 4-way connection termination with the
PBW. Eventually, the packet from the PBW also ar-
rived. We were thus unsure as to what triggered cen-
sorship – requests from the client to the PBW or their
responses?
In the past researchers have reported evidence of mid-
dleboxes in China that inspect both request from the
client and response from the server for censoring con-
tent [26, 27]. Thus, we also required heuristics to deter-
mine whether censorship was triggered by requests or
by responses.
In order to distinguish between the two possibilities,
we adopted the following approach. Initially, the client
runs traceroute to obtain the number of hops (n) to
the actual website. Thereafter, we establish a TCP 3-
way connection with the website and send two consecu-
tive HTTP GET requests for the blocked website. The IP
header of the first request has a TTL value of n−1 and
is not expected to reach the site, and thus no responses
from the site are expected. Whereas, the second is sent
to the site bearing a TTL value of n (and is expected
to be handled like a regular request).
Depending upon what the middleboxes en route in-
spect, there could be three possibilities:
• Possibility 1 (Middlebox inspects only the request):
Both the above requests would traverse the mid-
5we used python difflib library for this purpose.
dlebox and would respond back with a censorship
notification-cum-disconnection message.
• Possibility 2 (Middlebox inspects only the response):
The middlebox would be triggered when it inspects
the response messages, which happens only when
the request actually reaches the site and elicits it
(i.e. only corresponding to the second request).
• Possibility 3 (Middlebox inspects both request and
response): The middlebox sends censorship notification-
cum-disconnection message for both the request.
In our measurements for all ISPs, we observed cen-
sorship notification-cum-disconnection packet for both
the requests (i.e. for TTL=n−1 and TTL=n). This di-
rectly rules out the possibility 2, i.e middlebox getting
triggered only through responses.
The only remaining possibility is possibility 3, wherein
the middlebox inspects both requests and responses. In
order to distinguish possibilities 1 from 3, we crafted
our own HTTP GET request such that PBW interprets
it correctly but not the middlebox. For e.g., in Airtel
network, merely manipulating the case of the HTTP
header field Host and changing it to HOST was suffi-
cient for the request to go undetected by the middlebox
(while be correctly interpreted by the PBW). We show
in section 5 that for all ISPs, we managed to bypass the
censorship by only modifying the HTTP header fields
of the GET request. This confirms that middlebox is
only inspecting the request (possibility 1) and not the
response, as otherwise, we would still be receiving cen-
sorship notification when the responses carrying poten-
tially censored content would be intercepted (by the said
middlebox).
IV. How GET request triggers the middlebox?:.
Since middleboxes inspect the GET request for potential
censorship, we intend to confirm exactly how the mid-
dleboxes get triggered. By default a regular GET request
bares only the domain name along with the requested
page. We first ran traceroute to obtain the number
of hops to the server. Then, we crafted a GET request
whose IP TTL was set to the value of penultimate hop,
such that it passes the middlebox but never reaches the
server. Thus, we ensured that response (if) received
is from the middlebox and not the actual server. In
the payload, we fudged the domain name and its offset
within the request to determine exactly what triggered
censorship. For e.g., we set the HTTP Host field to that
of an uncensored site, while the domain name of the cen-
sored site was positioned at a random offset within the
HTTP header (say beyond the requested page indicated
in the GET field). In all our tests we observed only when
the Host field is set to the domain name of the cen-
sored site. Further details of more related experiments
are presented in section 4.2.
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As described ahead in Section 4, in three of the four
ISP where we observed HTTP censorship, the middle-
box responds back to the client with a variant of the
aforementioned censorship notification-cum-disconnection
messages. These were mostly HTTP 200 OK responses
carrying the state’s censorship notification along with
appropriate TCP bits enabled that force the client to
terminate the connection with the PBW. They bore ap-
propriate sequence and acknowledgement numbers (along
with other protocol header information) to make them
indistinguishable from legitimate packets which the client’s
underlying protocol stack expects, wrt the initial TCP
connection to the PBW.
In Section 5, we show how we exploit this knowledge
of protocol header idiosyncrasies, along with deliberate
fudging of the requested domain name in the Host field
of the GET requests to sidestep censorship.
V. Identifying location of HTTP middleboxes:.
After characterizing the blocking behavior, we intend
to identify the network location of middleboxes viz., IP
address. As earlier 3.2, we first ran traceroute to de-
termine the number of hops between the client and a
PBW (to be tested). We then use Iterative Network
Tracing (shown in figure 1) whereby following a regular
3-way handshake to the PBW, we sent series a crafted
HTTP GET request to it, with increasing TTL values
until it encounters the middlebox whence the client ob-
serves a censorship-notification-cum-disconnection mes-
sage (bearing TCP header with bits such as FIN or RST
enabled). Correlating this TTL value against the IP ad-
dress hops reported by traceroute helped us identify
the middleboxes.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to determine the censorship mechanism we
inspected for DNS, TCP/IP and HTTP blocking for the
list of potentially blocked websites in nine major ISPs
of the country (as explained in Section 3). For all ISPs,
we found instances of DNS and HTTP filtering only.
4.1 DNS filtering
We began our study by identifying the open DNS re-
solvers in a chosen ISP. Thereafter applying our heuris-
tics presented in Subsection 3.2 we determined which
of the 1200 curated PBWs were being censored along
with their corresponding DNS resolvers.
We observed poisoned DNS resolvers in only two of
the nine ISPs, viz., MTNL and BSNL.
Before presenting the results, we propose two metrics
to analyze the extent of DNS filtering within the ISPs:
1. Coverage: Ideally all DNS resolvers of an ISP must
be poisoned. We define the coverage as the fraction of
all the resolvers of the ISP which are poisoned.
2. Consistency : Ideally the same set of sites must be
blocked by all the poisoned resolvers of an ISP. We de-
termined the set of filtered URLs as well as all the re-
solvers that blocked them. For every filtered URL we
determine the fraction of poisoned resolver blocking it.
Consistency is the average of these fractions.
In MTNL, we found a total of 448 resolvers, out of
which 383 were poisoned, i.e. coverage was around 77%.
Whereas, in BSNL we found only 17 poisoned resolvers
out of a total of 182 (a smaller coverage of around 9.3%).
The consistency of each ISP can be inferred from Fig-
ure 2. Websites which are blocked in any of the two
ISPs are represented on the X-axis. The percentage of
resolvers blocking the website are represented on Y-axis.
For the sake of preserving anonymity, we represent the
sites with unique numbers, rather than actual names.
It can be clearly seen from the figure that in general
a single website (for eg., website ID 450) is blocked by
more number of resolvers in MTNL (44%) than in BSNL
(6.6%). The consistency metric in MTNL (42.4%) is
also higher than that of BSNL (7.5%).
0 5 0 1 0 0 1 5 0 2 0 0 2 5 0 3 0 0 3 5 0 4 0 0 4 5 0 5 0 0 5 5 00
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 0
6 0
7 0
8 0
9 0
1 0 0  M T N L B S N L
Per
cen
tag
e o
f re
sol
ver
s b
loc
kin
g th
e w
ebs
ite
I n d i v i d u a l  W e b s i t e  I D
Figure 2: Consistency of DNS resolvers.
4.2 HTTP filtering
We found HTTP filtering in four out of nine ISPs.
As already discussed in section 3.4, ISPs have deployed
middleboxes which inspect the packets between the client
and blocked websites with an intent to do blocking.
We began by identifying all those websites, among
the 1200 PBWs, that was censored by the ISP. For in-
stance in Airtel, we observed a total of 234 websites
to be censored. The corresponding number for the re-
maining three ISPs is presented in the last column of
table 2.
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Using the approach described in subsection 3.4 we de-
termined that censorship triggered solely due to request
and not the response6.
Finally, we attempt to find the actual network loca-
tion of the middleboxes with a variant of our Iterative
Network Tracing, involving crafted HTTP GET requests.
However, we were unable to pinpoint the exact IP ad-
dress of the middleboxes in most of our measurements
because of anonymization by the ISP. We discuss this
in detail in Section 6.
We now present in the behavior of the different types
of middleboxes, we identified in the wild and describe
their censorship mechanisms in detail.
4.2.1 Types of middleboxes
In our experiments, we identified two kinds of middle-
boxes–viz. Interceptive Middlebox (IM) and Wiretap
Middlebox (WM). IMs, hitherto unreported by others [49]
are akin to transparent proxies which intercept connec-
tions between the client and server and establish their
own to the server. In our studies, we found IMs which
intercept client to PBW connections and send back cen-
sorship notification messages back to the client, without
relaying the requests to the PBWs.
The other, i.e. WMs, have also observed in various
other censorious regimes [49], and involve a host that
is connected to an active network element via a wire-
tap. It receives a copy of all the packets exchanged and
inspects for requests that need to be censored. There-
after, it crafts responses and sends it back to the censor,
with appropriate TCP header bits, with the intent to
terminate existing connections.
The WMs are not as efficient as IMs, as they incur a
higher cost in searching all flows to find the ones cen-
sor. They cannot outpace the client–PBW traffic flow,
as they work with a copy of the packets, and therefore
not as effective in filtering every single request with
real-time efficiency (For WMs, in roughly 3 out of 10
attempts website gets rendered at the client machine,
whereas for IMs all attempts to open the website were
unsuccessful).
Interceptive middleboxes. We used our variant of iter-
ative network tracer (explained in Subsection 3.4) to
first obtain the location of middlebox in the network
path intervening the client and a filtered site (identified
beforehand using traceroute).
Thereafter, we sent crafted HTTP GET requests with
TTL values large enough to get past the network hop,
corresponding to the middlebox. Regardless of any fur-
ther increments to this IP TTL value, we never ob-
served the expected ICMP TTL Expired responses, but
rather received the censorship notification messages. In
6Middleboxes gets triggered solely in the presence of filtered
domains in Host field of the GET requests
order to verify that triggering event occurs only for
the blocked domain in Host field of GET request, we
sent a crafted request where Host field’s value was a
non-censored domain, with iteratively increasing val-
ues. Interestingly, in these cases, we always received
ICMP TTL Expired messages, even after TTL was large
enough for the packets to transit the middlebox.
We went a step ahead and selected an array of hosts
we controlled in different networks7 outside Indian ISPs.
On these machines, we hosted an ordinary webserver.
From our client, hosted in the ISP under test, we cre-
ated TCP connections to these remote machines. The
remote host simultaneously also monitors its own traf-
fic. The client sends crafted GET requests with Host
field requesting a censored domain. The destination IP
address, however, was that of the remote host. Upon
traversing a censorious middlebox positioned on the in-
tervening network path, the client receives a censorship
notification packet-cum-disconnection packets, with TCP
FIN bits enabled. The subsequent the 4-way disconnec-
tion always timeout (very likely dropped by the mid-
dlebox). Eventually, the client attempts to terminate
the connection by sending a RST packet. The remote
host receives none of these packets, other than the ini-
tial handshake messages and the said RST packet. The
TCP sequence number of this RST packet differs from
the one sent by the client, thereby confirming that it
was sent by the middlebox.
Further, all packets with the source IP of client and
destination IP of the blocked site are filtered after the
initial GET request and before the final RST packet.
We repeated the same exercise, by replacing the Host
field with that of an uncensored domain. Interestingly
enough, the request reaches the remote host unfiltered.
The functioning of the interceptive middlebox can be
is schematically shown in Figure 3.
Wiretapping middleboxes. Similar to interceptive mid-
dleboxes, we used our own variant of iterative network
tracer, to first obtain the location of the middlebox in
the network path intervening the client and a filtered
site.
After establishing TCP connection to the filtered site,
the client sent HTTP GET requests to it that bore the
URL of the blocked domain in the Host field. Inspect-
ing the network traffic for the said message exchanges
through pcap, we see that the client receives the cen-
sorship notification-cum-disconnection packet, with the
forged IP address (that of the server) and TCP FIN+PSH
bits enabled, which thereby enforces connection termi-
nation. But even before the termination process re-
solves, the client receives a fresh TCP RST packet from
the middlebox, bearing the forged IP address of the
server that forces the client to terminate the connec-
7Planetlab, cloud services and hosts in different universities
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Figure 3: Censorship mechanism of interceptive
middlebox.
tion immediately regardless of whether the termination
process, which is underway, completes or not.
Surprisingly, actual response from the filtered site
eventually also reaches the client, but the connection
to the server is already terminated by then. The client
responds to packets with (as expected) with a TCP RST
packet.
In order to confirm the censorship mechanism of wire-
tap middlebox, we adopted an approach similar to the
one described for interceptive middleboxes, involving re-
mote servers under our control. We sent crafted HTTP
GET requests bearing a filtered domain, to our controlled
remote server. These packets elicit the censorship notifi-
cation-cum-disconnection messages, bearing the (forged)
IP address of the remote host. The remote host, under
our control, however, receives the GET request, but does
not process them as it does not host the requested do-
main.
The behavior of the wiretap middleboxes is shown in
Figure 4.
Caveat:. Are middleboxes stateful or do they inspect
all packets? Our initial traffic inspections using pcap
hint towards stateful middleboxes that commence traffic
inspection only after complete TCP 3-way handshake is
resolved.
To confirm our hunches we began with the client us-
ing traceroute command to record the number of net-
work hops between itself and the filtered site. There-
after the client sends a TCP SYN packet with TTL just
large enough to get the packet to the penultimate hop
(and not the destination), thus avoiding a full-fledged
TCP 3-way handshake.
Finally, the client sends a crafted GET request whose
Host field points to a filtered domain and that has the
same TTL value, just used, so that it expires upon
3 Way Handshake 
Figure 4: Censorship mechanism of Wiretapping
middlebox.
reaching the penultimate hop.
If the middleboxes commence traffic inspection upon
observing every fresh TCP SYN packet, they must also
then inspect the subsequent crafted GET request and re-
spond back to the client with the censorship notification-
cum-disconnection message. However, we never observed
anything like that.
All other similar heuristics, such as starting by send-
ing a SYN+ACK or not sending the final ACK of a
regular 3-way handshake, but then sending the subse-
quent crafted GET request bore no different outcomes.
Finally, crafted HTTP GET request, bearing censori-
ous domain requests in the Host field, but with no pre-
ceding TCP handshake, also does not seem to trigger
censorship.
This confirms that the middleboxes are stateful and
commences traffic inspection only when they observe a
complete TCP handshake. These seem different from
what were observed by Wang et al. [49] who looked into
the architecture Chinese censorship infrastructure.
4.2.2 Analyzing Extent of HTTP Filtering
In order to analyze the extent of HTTP filtering in an
ISP we proposed variants of the two previous metrics,
viz. consistency and coverage.
1. Coverage: A censorious ISP which is willing to use
HTTP filtering ideally must deploy middleboxes in a
manner, such that all the router-level paths inside an
ISP must be intercepted by the middleboxes. We in-
tend to find intra ISP router level paths which are in-
tercepted by the middleboxes. Coverage is the fraction
of all router-level paths scanned that are intercepted by
middleboxes (we call poisoned paths).
2. Consistency : Ideally same number of websites must
be blocked on all the poisoned paths of the ISP. In such
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a case we say the ISP is 100% consistent. For every fil-
tered URL we determine the fraction of poisoned paths
blocking it. Consistency is the average of these frac-
tions.
In order to find consistency and coverage we started
our experiments with single vantage point (VP) in the
ISPs. As already discussed earlier, HTTP censorship
middleboxes are agnostic to the destination IP addresses
of the HTTP GET requests (as long as they appear to
be a part of an existing TCP connection). We harness
this behavior of middlebox to find their coverage and
placement statistics.
We establish TCP connections with Alexa top 1000
websites from the client machine and sent GET requests
with Host fields pointing to all 1200 PBWs. Even if
for single GET request we observed the censorship, we
considered that path to be poisoned by the middlebox.
For Reliance Jio ISP, we only observed 64 out of 1000
paths to be tainted with middlebox. This gave us the
hint that maybe middleboxes are not placed optimally
to intercept a large fraction of ISP paths.
Thus, to further test our observation with more van-
tage points, we used various hosts outside India, but
under our control (PlanetLab nodes, cloud infrastruc-
ture, and some others in various universities). Our aim
was to find the maximal possible number of middleboxes
and the fraction of paths they intercept, inside an ISP.
For doing so, we began by scanning all live IP pre-
fixes8 for a particular ISP, and searched for hosts with
open TCP port 80. Then we randomly sample two such
IPs per prefix. We recorded the router-level path lead-
ing and the number of hops to each of these prefixes,
from each vantage point, using traceroute.
We tailored our Iterative Network Tracing, targeting
traces to each of these IPs (for all ISPs), where for each
targeted host, we send 1200 HTTP GET requests, corre-
sponding to each of the PBWs. If we get the censorship
notification-cum-disconnection response for even a sin-
gle site, we consider the corresponding network path to
be poisoned.
We summarize our results in table 2. Column two
and three represents coverage for an ISP from a single
VP within ISP and multiple VPs outside of the ISP.
Column four describes which type of middlebox (inter-
ceptive or wiretap) is deployed in the ISP and last col-
umn describes the total number of websites blocked out
of 1200 PBW. It can be observed that Idea has highest
coverage (90%) whereas Vodafone has very low coverage
value (2.5%).
For Reliance Jio, we observed a very different be-
havior. While we observed a relatively low coverage
of about 6.4% when searching for middleboxes from a
vantage point positioned inside the network, we found
8obtained from CIDR report [2]
ISP Coverage (%) Coverage (%) Middle- No. of
(VP: (VPs: Box websites
within ISP) outside ISP) Type blocked
Airtel 75.2 54.2 WM 234
Idea 92 90 IM 338
Vodafone 11 2.5 IM 483
Jio 6.4 0 WM 200
Table 2: HTTP filtering in different ISPs.
no middleboxes when probing for middleboxes from re-
mote hosts to hosts inside the ISP with open TCP port
80. We never observed a single instance of middlebox
while we were probing from our distributed VPs. There
are two possible explanations for this – either they have
placed middleboxes sub-optimally and thus they are not
observed to the VPs outside of ISP. Alternatively, they
maybe filtering request not only on domain names but
also for source IPs belonging to Jio network itself.
Since, we never observed the IP address of the mid-
dlebox, we were unable to find the exact reason that
why we never observed any middlebox when tested from
outside of the ISP network.
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Figure 5: Consistency of middleboxes.
After finding the coverage of different ISPs, we now
present the results obtained from computing consistency
for each of them. In figure 5, X-axis represents websites
which are blocked in any of the three ISPs (Vodafone,
Airtel and Idea). The percentage of ISP paths that
block a particular website are represented on Y-axis. It
is evident from the figure, that on an average Idea net-
work has highest consistency (76.8%) followed by Airtel
(12.3%) and Vodafone (11.6%). It can be interpreted
as, in Idea network a single website is blocked on 76.8%
of the poisoned paths, as opposed to Airtel and Voda-
fone in which it is blocked by only ≈ 11 − 12% of the
10
poisoned paths.
So far we discussed all details regarding HTTP filter-
ing, but ignore HTTPS. We observed fewer than five
instances of HTTPS filtering which were actually due
to manipulated DNS responses by poisoned resolvers.
4.3 Collateral Damage within Indian ISPs
ISPs have contractual commercial agreements for rout-
ing Internet traffic among themselves [32] making them
neighbors. Collateral damage occurs when traffic of
non-censorious ISP transit through its peering censori-
ous ISP. Previous studies that have explored censorship
by collateral damage [39, 21], have focused on how one
nation is impacted by the Internet censorship policies
of other nation. Whereas, in this work we highlight
collateral damage is possible within the same country
itself. For instance, in ISPs like NKN, Sify and Siti, we
never observed any filtering caused by their own poli-
cies, rather all the censorship instances are solely due
to its peers policies, whereas for MTNL and BSNL it is
the cumulative effect of its own and neighbors’ policies.
Table 3 summarizes our findings.
ISPs Neighboring ISPs
(cesnored) (causing censorship)
NKN Vodafone (69), TATA9 (8)
Sify TATA (142), Airtel (2)
Siti Airtel (110)
MTNL Airtel (25), TATA (134)
BSNL Airtel (1), TATA (156)
Table 3: Collateral Damage: Non censorious
ISP observe censorship due to their censorious
peering ISPs. In NKN, we observed 69 websites
were blocked by Vodafone and 8 were blocked
by TATA communication.
5. ANTI-CENSORSHIP APPROACHES
Broadly classifying we observed two types of censor-
ships in popular ISPs of India viz., HTTP filtering and
DNS poisoning. In order to anti-censor them, we opted
techniques depending upon the middlebox under action.
Our solutions are simple and extremely effective.
Evading DNS poisoning: In order to circumvent
poisoned DNS resolver, any non-poisoned resolvers can
be used. We tested with OpenDNS, Google’s public
DNS (8.8.8.8) and many other non-poisoned resolvers
which belong to non - censorious countries like Ireland,
Canada, and Sweden. With each of them, we were able
to bypass the DNS based censorship.
Evading HTTP filtering: As already explained in
section 3.4 middlebox gets triggered upon identifying a
blocked domain in the HOST field of GET request only.
Our goal is to craft such a GET request, which is not
correctly interpreted by the middlebox but by the actual
website. We tried various techniques involving string
fudging [36], such as manipulating the Host field values,
prepending www to the website name, changing cases of
the keywords like HTTP, GET and HOST, adding spaces
before and after the domain name etc.. Additionally
we also tried approaches, like sending fragmented GET
requests and using HTTP 2.0 as the underlying web
protocol (instead of HTTP 1.1). Different approaches
worked for sidestepping different middleboxes.
I. Wiretapping middleboxes: There are two ap-
proaches with which we bypassed these middleboxes.
• Changing the case of Host keyword in the GET re-
quest: Most popular browsers, like Mozilla Firefox
and Google Chrome, use the title case for the Host
keyword. Merely changing the case (e.g. changing
it to HOst, HoST, HoSt or HOSTetc.) was suffi-
cient for request to go undetected via the middle-
boxes (of Airtel and Jio), but resulting in response
from the actual blocked webserver. This suggests
that the webservers, corresponding to the PBWs,
adhere to RFC 2616 [8] and accept the keyword
Host agnostic of the case, while the middleboxes
look for exact keyword matches.
• Dropping the packets with RST or FIN bit set:
As mentioned earlier, the censorship notification-
cum-disconnection packet has the TCP FIN bit
set. Subsequently the middlebox also sends a TCP
RST packet to enforce the client to disconnect.
Using iptables utility, all the packets (of blocked
website’s IP) which have FIN or RST bit set were
dropped by the kernel. For Airtel, we observed
that responses from middleboxes of Airtel always
bear a fixed IP-Identifier value of 242. Thus, we
added a general rule that FIN or RST packets with
IP-Identifier field 242 must be dropped. This effec-
tively filters the responses from the middleboxes.
Since the actual GET requests are not dropped by
the middlebox, they reached the blocked website
and elicit regular responses. These response con-
taining the actual content of the website and are
accepted by the client browser.
II. Interceptive middleboxes: We further found
two types of interceptive middleboxes i.e., one which
sends only censorship notification-cum-disconnection mes-
sage to the client (overt) and other which sends only a
RST packet to the client without any censorship notifi-
cation (covert).
• Overt Censorship: To bypass such middleboxes
which overtly censors the content, we fudged the
Host field of the GET request. The standard do-
main request looks like “Host: blocked.com”, i.e.
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only one space between ‘:’ and ‘blocked.com’. But,
instead, if we place additional spaces (or tab) in-
between, i.e. “Host: blocked.com”, then the
requests go undetected by the middleboxes, but
servers interpret them correctly. Also, adding ex-
tra spaces (or tables) after the domain name works,
e.g.“Host:blocked.com ”.
• Covert Censorship: For bypassing such middlebox
we intentionally inserted multiple Host fields (with
different website names) in the same GET request
to check which one of those is inspected by the
middlebox. For all cases, we observed that it is
triggered upon inspecting only the last Host key-
word. Thus appending an uncensored domain re-
quest to the array of such Host keywords, we were
able to bypass the middleboxes, but the server also
neglects it as the request is not a standard one.
Thus we crafted an unusual GET request, which
looked something like “GET / HTTP/1.1 Host:
blocked.com...\r\n\r\n Host: allowed.com”. This
request is neglected by the middlebox but on the
other hand, accepted by the actual blocked web-
site. Since middlebox is only looking at last Host
keyword, it interprets that packet as non-suspicious
and allows it to pass through. The server, on the
other hand, treats the ‘\r\n\r\n’ as the end of
the GET request and the subsequent “Host: al-
lowed.com” as a separate request. Thus, the client
receives two responses from the website — the ac-
tual content which due to the first Host field and
the BAD REQUEST message for the subsequent
one.
6. DISCUSSION
6.1 Count of middleboxes in the ISP
In the previous study on China [52] authors reported
that they found 495 router interfaces that have filter-
ing device attached to them. However, in India, we
could not follow the same approach. Throughout our
research, we used traceroutes and iterative network
tracer, with an intent of finding the location of cen-
sorship infrastructure. In all our tested ISPs, generally
middlebox (or routers to which they are attached) show
up as unresponsive routers (asterisked) when probed us-
ing traceroute. It is natural to ask if IP address of the
middlebox is not known then how we confirmed that
blocking behavior was an outcome of our test ISP or
one its upstream provider? We applied few heuristics:
(1) On the paths where we observed the IP of a mid-
dlebox, first we confirmed that it belongs to same test
ISP and later we recorded the corresponding censorship
notification. If from other anonymized middleboxes we
got the same notification, we considered it to be from
same ISP.
(2) In path segments where asterisked router appeared
between visible ones, we checked if the latter belonged
to the same test ISP. If so then we assume that anonymized
IPs belong to the same ISP.
(3) The censorship notification messages have unique
characteristics for eg., in Airtel, the censorship notifica-
tion packet has an embedded iframe which redirects to
“airtel.com/dot” and in Reliance JIO censored response
redirects to its own unique IP address. In such cases,
we easily identify the ISP of anonymized middlebox.
6.2 Issues with OONI
As already explained in section 3.1, OONI performs
two sets of experiments for a given list of PBWs (1) ac-
cessing sites from client machine and (2) and accessing
the same from a control sever (of OONI). If discrepan-
cies in IP address resolutions (DNS censorship) or re-
trieved site contents (HTTP censorship) are observed,
OONI flags the PBW to censored.
However, we found that results of OONI are mis-
leading. It suffers from both false positives and false
negatives. We now outline few possible reasons for false
positives (incorrect flagging of sites as being censored):
• An Unavailable website, previously hosted on host-
ing services like GoDaddy, if removed, may give
different HTTP responses when accessed from dif-
ferent locations – an artifact of distributed hosting.
Though not a case of censorship, OONI flags them
as filtered.
• Many websites have dynamic content such as live
news feeds and advertisement embedded in the
HTTP 200 OK messages that are often location
dependent. These are also classified by OONI as
being censored.
Also, OONI tool inspects differences in HTTP head-
ers and body lengths of the response. If differences are
greater than a threshold, it considers the site to be fil-
tered. We observe that for a website hosted on CDN,
the response at different geographic locations may come
through different servers having obvious differences in
the response metadata. In reality, such sites may not
be blocked.
Thus when we created our scripts, we only calculated
the difference in the content of the response, not the
headers. If the difference is greater than the thresh-
old, rather than directly reporting them as blocked, we
manually verified them for blocking.
We now discuss why OONI often fails to detect a
censored site (false negatives). In order to identify cen-
sorship, OONI calculates the difference between (1) the
body length of compared websites (over the control server
and the network of the user) differs by some percentage
(2) the HTTP header names do not match and (3) the
HTML title tags do not match.
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Even if a single aforementioned condition does not
hold true [7, 12], OONI considers the website to be non
censorious. The following are few possible cases where
OONI reports false negatives:
• We observed that for some websites, the response
does not contain the content, rather a legitimate
redirection link sent by the actual server. Simi-
larly, in the censorship notification-cum-disconnection
packets, there is an embedded iframe (which redi-
rects to blocked page). For both the cases, the dif-
ference in the body length (of the responses) may
be very less 10. Thus, violating the condition one.
• OONI flags a website as non censored if the header
fields (not their values) of both the HTTP response
matches exactly11. In our measurements, we have
observed that most of the middleboxes use the
same HTTP header as of the actual web server.
Thus, the headers of censorship notification-cum-
disconnection packets matches with response header
from the actual server. So, OONI mistakenly clas-
sifies a censored website to be non censored as the
second condition is violated.
Censorship notification-cum-disconnection packets that
we observed have no HTML title tags. On the con-
trary, most of the responses from the actual website
did. OONI compares the title tags from both responses
only if at least one word in both the tags is at least
five characters long. Thus, in our case, this condition
is never checked. Thus, only the two aforementioned
conditions may contribute towards the false negatives.
6.3 Idiosyncrasy of middleboxes
• Ideal middleboxes inspect traffic agnostic of their
port number, while all the rest inspect only re-
quests destined to TCP port 80.
• WM specific to Airtel have a unique characteris-
tic – all packets generated from these middleboxes
have a fixed IP-ID value (242) in the IP header;
whereas for all others’, this is variable.
• There are some websites which are now unavailable
(tested via Tor circuits ending in non-censorious
country) but still blocked by the ISPs (both through
HTTP and DNS filtering). This implies that ISPs
are not updating their blacklists.
• Middlebox (IM and WM) maintains a state for all
transiting TCP connections. It inspects all the
connections for 2 − 3 minutes, waiting for sensi-
tive content12 to arrive. If it does not receive any
10Other variants of such scenarios are also possible for eg., a
small sign up/login page upon accessing the website
11We inspected the source code to ensure that this is the only
case
12Domain names which are possibly blocked.
packet in that duration, it times out and purges
the corresponding TCP state data. However, if
fresh packets (corresponding to the individual flows,
regardless of whether they are GET requests or not)
arrive in the meantime, it restarts the timer for the
timeout.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this work, we report a comprehensive analysis of
censorship mechanism and infrastructure in nine popu-
lar ISPs of India. We commenced our research by using
popular censorship detection tool OONI, but since we
observed high false positives and negatives, we discon-
tinued it. We developed our own automated approach
(Interative Network Tracer), along with various heuris-
tics, which we used to determine the type of censorship
mechanism involved (and in some cases the approximate
location of the censorship infrastructure as well). At
every step we confirm our findings against the ground
truth, an effort largely ignored by several others in the
recent and distant past.
We primarily found DNS and HTTP filtering as the
only techniques of censorship employed by these ISPs.
Further, we evolved metrics, viz. coverage and con-
sistency that respectively describe how well the cen-
sorship infrastructure covers the ISP and how consis-
tent they are in censoring filtered domains. In passing,
we also observed interesting cases of collateral damage
within the ISPs of the same country. Finally, we devel-
oped novel anti-censorship techniques, involving local
firewalling and manipulating the HTTP GET requests,
through which we were able to bypass all forms of cen-
sorship without relying on conventional methods involv-
ing proxies and VPNs.
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